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Post—War Capital Accumulation and the Threat of NuclearWar
ABSTRACT
The hypothesis of this paper is that theperformance and, in par-
ticular, the rate of capital accumulation of thepost—war U.S. economy
has been influenced by the changes in thepublic perception of the threat
of a catastrophic nuclear war. An increased threatshortens the expected
horizon of individuals and firms, and thus reduces thewillingness to
postpone present consumption in favor of investment.
The hypothesis is tested by expanding a standardsavings function
estimation technique to include a measure of theperceived threat of
nuclear war. Four alternative measures of theperceived threat are con-
sidered, all of which are based on the setting of the clockpublished
monthly in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists which reflects theeditors'
judgment about the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. Thetests all support
a large and statistically significant impact of the threatof nuclear
war on the rate of private saving.
These tests are not viewed as conclusive evidence in favorof the
economic impact of the perceived threat of nuclearwar. Nevertheless,
this research suggests that economistsmay have been overlooking an im-
portant source of variation in the post—war, post—nuclear U.S.
economy.
Conceivably, it could affect not only the private savings rate but also
such things as the level of investment in humancapital, the level of
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(612) 373—3607Most economists would not quarrel with the statement that desired
saving by households is potentially sensitive to changes in expected
life span and the ability to leave bequests. After all, lifecycle
saving and saving for bequests are two of the most important motives
for accumulating wealth. From this perspective it is notable that
recent attempts to explain variations in post—war rates of capital
accumulation (Boskin, 1978; I-Iowrey and Hymans, 1978) have failed to
consider a potentially significant contribution to changes inexpected
life span and the perceived ability to leave bequests the threat
of nuclear war. Popular perception of the likelihood ofa nuclear war
is by no means insignificant. A recent Associated Press/NBC News
public opinion survey found that 76 per cent of Americans believe war
is likely within a few years.-1 Moreover, when asked if, in the event
of a world war, nuclear weapons would be used on the U.S.,typically
70 per cent of Americans answer in the affirmative.-' Finally,
in 1963, 89 per cent of Americans perceived their chances ofsurviving
a nuclear war to be 50—50 or less.-'Apparently, a significant fraction
of Americans take the threat of a life—threatening nuclear war in the
not—too—distant future to be a real possibility. There is also evidence,
to be discussed later, that the perceived threat of nuclear war has
varied quite a bit since the end of World War II. The hypothesis of
this paper is that these changes in the perceived threat of nuclearwar
have had a significant impact on the rate of capital accumulation in
the U.S. in the past thirty—five years.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section I
develops some simple economic reasoning about the expected impact of a
threat of nuclear war. In Section II, I present ameasure of the—2—
threat of nuclear war, describe a test of the hypothesis,and describe
the data to be used in the test. Section IIIdescribes the results
of the test, and in Section IV the plausibilityof the estimated effect
is considered. Some concluding remarks are offeredin Section V.
I. Savings, Investment, and the Threat ofNuclear War
Consider an individual who dies a natural death atthe end of T
periods.-" At the end of the ith period there is a probability p.
of a nuclear war which kills the individualand any of his potential
heirs. If the individual is still alive as of periodI ,thereis a
T
probability
that death will occur at the end of that
period, unless I =T—1,inwhich case the probability is unity.




+ .,.+(1 (U(CT) + V(B))
U' > 0, UtI < O ''> 0,V" < 0
where C. is consumption and U(C1) is the utility enjoyedduring
period i , is a discount factor, B is the amount of bequests left,
and V(B) is the satisfaction dervied by the bequeathor.Let the
probability that the individual survivesinto the ith period,
i—l
1 — (I > 1) ,bedenoted q. .Ther(,equation (1) can be rewritten as
T
(2) EU =.1q11U(C)+ qf3TV(B)
It is assumed that life insurance and annuity contractswritten
concerning death due to nuclear war are notavailable. Also it is not—3—
required that the individual at all times maintain non—negative
wealth, thus allowing the possibility of dying with outstanding
debts. It is, though, required that the consumer have non—negative
wealth if and when he or she reaches period T.Underthese conditions
the sole constraint on the maximization problem is that
(3) A(l + r)T + (1 + r)T(Y. —C.)—B=0
where Ais initial assets, Y1 is labor earnings during period i,
andr is the rate of interest per period. Maximizing (2) subject to
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Thus, an increased probability of future nuclear war (that is, a decrease
in q, if j >1)has the effect of increasing the effective
discounting of the future. The individual will tend to substitute
earlier consumption for later consumption and thus reduce the rate of
wealth accumulation.——4—
Nuclear war, as opposed to the natural death of human beings,
willdoubtlessly destroy capital goods. This wouldreduce the
expected present value of investment projects,especially for long—lived
projects. If the present discountedvalue of the project's income stream
is
R2 ____ RN
(6) -c+R+ + +....
1 1 (l+r) (l+r)2 (l±r)
(where C1 is the cost of the project and R.is the return in period
I of a project lasting N periods) in the absenceof the possibility
of a nuclear war which destroys all capital goods,in its presence the
expected present discounted value is
N—i




Asthe probability of war increases, the expected presentvalue of
some projects goes from positive to negative.Thus, desired investment at
any interest rate will decline.
Straightforward economic reasoning has led us tothe conclusion
that an increase in the perceived likelihoodof nuclear war would
reduce ceteris paribus, both desired saving anddesired investment.
Inthe context of an equilibrium model of a growing economy,this
would lead to a reduced rate of capital accumulation.Depending on
thedetail and characteristics of the particular model chosen,it could—5—
also decrease the market value of long—lived assets, alter the
term structure of interest rates, and have other impacts on the state
of the economy. In this paper I have chosen to concentrate on the
possible relationship between the threat of nuclear war and the rate
of capital accumulation. In the next section I begin the task of
investigating whether such a relationship can be detected in the
post—war U.S. economy.
II. Data and Methodology
The approach adopted here is to compare the time series of the
annual rate of capital accumulation with the time series of a measure
of the perceived threat of nuclear war. The choice of this latter
measure is discussed first.
Public opinion survey data seems a reasonable source of information
about public perceptions of the likelihood of war. Unfortunately,
although relevant questions have been posed in national surveys, in
no case has the same question been asked over a long stretch of time since the
end of World War II. There does exist, though, a continually
available series which represents a professionally informed opinion
about the state of international tensions and the likelihood of a
nuclear war. Since 1947, the Editorial Advisory Board of the Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists has printed on its editorial page a clock whose
hands are set at a time approaching midnight. Just how close to midnight
the hands are set represents the Board's judgment about how great the
danger of nuclear war is. When it first appeared in 1947, the clock
stood at seven minutes to midnight. It has since been moved ten times.
It has come ominously close to "doomsday": three minutes to midnight6—
in 1949, after the first Russian atomic bomb test, and two minutes to
midnight in 1953 in response to U.S. and Soviet development of the
hydrogen bomb. It was then gradually moved back in appreciation of the
thawing of the Cold War and, in particular, because of the Partial
Test—Ban Treaty (1963), the Nuclear Non—Proliferation Treaty (1969), and
the SAlT I agreement (1972). From June of 1972 to September of 1974
the clock stood at twelve minutes to midnight. However, since 1974,
the clock has been moved closer and closer to midnight, reflecting the
intensification of the nuclear and conventional arms races and the
apparent possession of nuclear weapons by a growing number of countries.
The last time it was moved was in January of 1981, to four minutes to
midnight .-i
Althoughthis variable is not directly a measure of the average
individual's perceptions of the danger of nuclear war, it does represent
informed opinion and should therefore be highly correlated with the
general perception. In addition, it has the advantage of being
available without interruption since 1947. The average setting of the
clock for each year beginning in 1947 is given in Table 1.
Table 1
"Minutes to Midnight," 1948—1979
Year Value Year Value Year Value Year Value
1948 7.0 1956 2.0 1964 12.0 1972 11.17
1949 6.0 1957 2.0 1965 12.0 1973 12.0
1950 3.0 1958 2.0 1966 12.0 1974 11.0
1951 3.0 1959 2.0 1967 12.0 1975 9.0
1952 3.0 1960 7.0 1968 7.0 1976 9.0
1953 2.67 1961 7.0 1969 9.33 1977 9.0
1954 2.0 1962 7.0 1970 10.0 1978 9.0
1955 2.0 1963 8.25 1971 10.0 1979 9.0—7—
One problem with using the clock's setting as an index of the
nuclear threat is that, in order to enhance its public impact, the
Editorial Board seems to favor infrequent, large changes in the clock's
hand. Thus, the clock's movements may lag behind the actual changes
in the state of international tensions and also overstate the current
escalation or de—escalation of tensions. To account for this possibility,
a five—year moving average of the clock setting is considered as an
alternative measure of the perceived threat of nuclear war.2-"
Although the clock setting seems to be a reasonable measure of
the likelihood of international conflict, what we are really interested
in measuring is the probability of annihilation due to a war. This
likelihood may be thought of as the product of the likelihood of nuclear
war and the probability of death/destruction from a war. From this
perspective, the clock's setting fails to account for the fact that the
size of the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union (and the United States)
has not remained constant in this period, and the probable destructiveness
of a nuclear war has no doubt greatly increased since 1947. To reflect
this aspect of the nuclear threat, I have constructed an index of the
likely devastation of a nuclear war, which is equal to the estimated
total of Soviet submarine—based missiles, and long—range bombers.
These estimates are available annually since l947.-' Using these figures,
(denoted WEAP), a measure of the likelihood of destruction due to
nuclear war is formed as (NIN_MIN)
WEAPt,whereMINt refers to the
minutes from midnight the clock is set at in year t,andHIN is an
arbitrarily chosen standard indicating no threat of war. This constructed
variable thus increases either when the clock moves closer to midnight—8—
or the Soviet nuclear arsenal expands. The value of MIN used is 17;
this implies that at the most threatening period (two minutes to
midnight) the probability of nuclear war was three times as great
as in the least threatening period (twelve minutes to midnight).
Figure 1 plots the path since 1947 of the first measure of the
threat of nuclear war, the clock setting, shown as a dotted line.
Measured on the vertical axis is the number of minutes from midnight
the clock is set at; thus, higher values correspond to a lower
perceived threat of nuclear war. Also plotted on Figure 1 is a measure
of the rate of capital accumulation, the ratio of net private saving to
disposable income plus retained earnings. According to the theory,
there should be a positive association between this measure of capital
accumulation and a perceived low probability of nuclear war. In fact,
the two variables apparently exhibit a positive association. Both
start high in 1947, decline and stay approximately constant until 1960.
Beginning in 1960 there is a diminution in the threat of nuclear war
and a concurrent increase in the rate of saving. Both reach a peak
in the mid 1960's, decline sharply in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
Another local peak is attained in both series around 1973. Beginning
in 1974, the threat of nuclear war has increased, while the rate of
saving has steadily declined. Clearly several of the turning points
and local extrema of the two series nearly coincide. The main
disparity comes from the comparison of the 1970's to the 1950's.
According to the clock, the threat of war was lower in the 1970's





















































































































































wasnohigher than in the 1950's. However, in those twenty years the
nuclear arsenals of both countries greatly expanded, and thus the
probability of death due to nuclear war wsa no doubt higher in the
1970's than in the 1950's. This aspect of the changed international
situation would be picked up by the constructed variables which
include a measure of the Soviet nuclear capability.
This apparent parallel movement between the rate of saving and
the freedom from the threat of nuclear war depicted in Figure 1 is
tested by estimating a standard savings function. The standard
specification is extended by adding one of the indices of the threat
of nuclear war discussed earlier. The specifications investigated
have the basic form
(8) a + a1 + a2 L1+a3 L1+ a4 LNEM
+a NWAR+a. NWAR
5 t e t—l
This is similar tD the specification estimated by Boskin (1978) and
Howrey and Humans(1978)2'. The dependent variable is the ratio of
net private saving to disposable income plus retained earnings. LNY
is the natural logarithm of real per capita disposable income plus
retained earnings)' LNW is the logarithm of real per capita non—human
wealth. (Non—human wealth is defined as the sum of net financial
assets at the beginning of the year and noncorporate and household
capital at replacement cost. The series is taken from }Iayashi (1981)).
LNUNEM is the logarithm of the unemployment rate, included to pick up any10 —
cyclicalvariation in savings behavior. The final two independent
variablesrefer to one of the four measures of the threat of nuclear
war. In the case of the unaveraged measures
(MINtandPWAR,defined
below) a lagged value is included to pickup any delayed response of
saving and also to reflect the fact that allthe variables are annual
averages.Savings in January will not reflect changes in the explanatory
variablesthat occurlater in the year, but will respond to thosechanges
thatoccurred in the previous year. For the movingaverage measures,
only the current value is included.
III. Results
Equation (8) was estimated using ordinary least—squares for the
period 1948 to 1979. The results of estimating fourseparate regression
equations are presented below, each one corresponding to a different
index of the threat of nuclear war. The four indexesare (1) the average
clock setting in the current year, calledMIN (ii) the five—year
moving average of the clock setting, calledMINAVt (iii) the constructed
variable (l7_MIN) x WEAPt,calledPWARand (iv) the constructed
variable using themoving average measure of the threat ofwar, called
PWARAVt .Standarderrors are listed in parentheses below the estimated
coefficient.
S
(9) —s= —0.00182+ 0.130 LNY —0.196LNY
i+ 0.0556 LNW
1 (0.060) (0.077) (0.084) (0.030)






(10) =0.0358+ 0.107 LNY-. 0.146LNY+0.0269 LNW
t(0.058) (0.082) (0.089) (0.030)
t—1







(11)—= 0.513+ 0.264 LNY— 0.134LNY —0.0241LNW t(0.120) (0.059) (0.070) (0.027)
—0.00191 LJNEM+ (5.76x 109)PWAR —(2.97io_6 PWAR









—0.00313 LNUNEM— (3.13x 101)PWARAV




In all four equations one of the nuclear war variables has
the expected sign, which is positive for equations (9) and (10) and
negative for equations (11) and (12). In equations (9)and (11) it is— 12—
thelagged value which has the explanatory power. In all the equations,
the 95% confidence interval of the appropriate variable does not include
zero. Furthermore, in all cases the magnitude of the estimated effect
of the threat of nuclear war on the savings ratio is large relativeto
the average observed ratio and its variation in thepost—war period.
Consider first equations (9) and (10), where the nuclear war variable
has the units of a number of minutes to midnight. The estimated effect
(which is the sum ofa5 and a6 for equation (9)) of about 0.0017
implies that a change from the period of lowest nuclear threat in the
post—war period (twelve minutes to midnight) to the greatest threat
(two minutes until midnight) implies a decline in the savings ratio of
0.017, or 1.7 percentage points. This compares to an average post—war
value of 0.102 and a standard deviation in post—war of 0.011.
Now consider the estimated coefficients of the nuclear threat
variable in equations (11) and (12), which are on the order of 3x io_6
In 1979, the value of MINE was 9.0 and the value ofWEAPt was 2582.
The estimated coefficients thus imply that an increase ininternational
tensions equal to a drop of MINt to 4.0 (which is where it standsas
of 1981) would at the current level of weaponry be associated witha
decline in the saving ratio of 0.039. At the 1979 value ofMINt ,a
50 per cent increase in Soviet weaponry would imply a decline in the
saving rate of 0.031.
The estimated wealth and unemployment effects have mixed success
in meeting prior expectations. The coefficient on the wealth variable
is never statistically significant, and has the expected negative
sign only in equations (11) and (12). The coefficient on the— 13—
unemploymentvariable in all cases has the expected negative sign,
but is significant only in equations (9) and (10).
Several variants of the basic equations (9)—(12) were investigated.
Two are worth mentioning here. The first applied a first—order
autocorrelation connection procedure to equations (9) and (10), the
cases where the Durbin—Watson statistic indicated the presenceof
positive autocorrelation. The new estimates were not substantially
different from those presented above. The only change of note is that
the estimated coefficient of PWARt in equation (10) had a t—statistic
of 1.76, making it significantly different from zero with 90 per cent
confidence but not 95 per cent confidence.
The other important extension of the basic equations entailed
adding other independent variables which may be expected toinfluence
aggregate savings behavior. The additional variablesconsidered
were (1) a demographic variable, the logarithm of the ratioof the
population over 20 which are between the age of 45 and 64, the group
with the highest saving propensity; (ii) the logarithm of the effective
tax rate on capital income in the non—financial corporatesector',
included in order to pick up variations in the after—tax rate of return
on a major form of investment; and (iii) the ratio ofdefense spending
to GNP, in order to pick up any interaction between the threat of war,
the level of exogenous spending, and the macroeconomic impact of that
spending. Jhen these variables are added to the basic specifications,
the significance of the nuclear threat variables is not disturbed
in any case except equation (10), where the coefficient of EWARt
while positive, becomes insignificantly different from zero. In the— 14—
otherthree cases, the magnitude of the estimated nuclear threat
coefficients is not substantially different from thosereported above.
The additional variables themselves have mixedsuccess in adding
explanatory power to the equations. The demographic variable is the
most successful, always attracting the expected positivesign and
always significant at least at the 90 per cent confidence level.
However, the tax and defense spending variables are in all cases
insignificant.
These results establish that the apparent inverserelationship
between savings rates and the perceived threat of nuclearwar noticed
in Figure 1 survives a standard statistical test whichincludes other
possible influences on savings. In addition, there isreason to
believe that the regression analysis understates theexplanatory
power of the nuclear war variable. The clock setting changed only
eight times during the thirty—two years sample period, and thus
cannot possibly account for "within—an—era" Variations in the
savings rate. A more sensitive measure of the perceived threat would
reduce the measurement error problem and couldreasonably be expected
to have more explanatory power and a larger estimated absolute effect.
IV. Are the Results Plausible?
In this section I will attempt to convince the reader of the
plausibility of such variations in saving rates in response to changed
perceptions of the likelihood of nuclear war. First, do people perceive
nuclear war to be a likely possibility over the near future? The answer,
if we are to believe the answers people give in public opinion polls,
is a definite yes. During the fifties and sixties, people were asked
whether they thought there would be a world war in the next five years.
Of those having an opinion, the percentage answering yes ranged from— 15—
fortyto sixty—five. Most recently, 76 per cent of Americans said that
war was likely within five years. Also, people were askedwhether in
the event of a world war the hydrogen bomb would be used against the
U.S. The percentage answering yes to this question varied between
sixty and seventy—five per cent from the mid—1950's to 1973. Combining
theseresponses leads quickly to the conclusion that during this era
it is plausible that between one—quarter and one—half of all Americans
believedthat a nuclear warwaslikely within thecoming five years
Theproportion who believe itlikelyover the next thirty years must
12/
surely be significantly higher than that.—
These figures establish that nuclear war is considered to be a
plausible event for the near future by a large number of Americans.
The renaming question is whether variations in its perceived likelihood
over the post—war period can explain significant changes in the saving
rate, Of course, the analysis presented earlier above establishes a
statistically significant association. But are the estimated magnitudes
consistent with other evidence about the interteraporal elasticity of
substitution and the degree of risk aversion?
To investigate this question, consider a two—period life—cycle model
with a cardinal utility function of
(13) U = +C)
Theimplied intertetuporal elasticity of substitution is 1/(1 —a)
Ifthere is a probability p of a nuclear war at the end of the
firstperiod, the individualwill maximize expected utility, which
isequal to— 16—
(14) EU + (1 -p)C)
subject to the constraint
(15) C2 =(W—
C1)(l+ r)
where W is the present value of the endowment stream. It is











The dependence of saving on the probability of nuclearwar can
be quantitatively evaluated by inserting reasonable numbersinto this
expression. As an illustration, I have chosen r,theinterest
rate for a period approximating thirty years, to beone, and ,
thepure discount rate for this same time period, to be 0.75. Finally,
I let the first—period endowment be equal to four—fifths of the
present value of the earnings stream (Y1 .8W) .Usingthese
parameter values, the responsiveness of the first—period saving
ratio,(Y1 —C1)/Y1




In order to judge whether a swing in the rate of saving of 0.017 or more is a
plausible response to the maximum variation in the threat of nuclear
war since 1947, we need to know what a reasonable value of a is
and also we need to translate the variation in the threat of war into
variations in the value of p .Econometricevidence on a ,orthe
intertemporal elasticity of substitutiOn 1/(1 —a),hasnot centered
as of yet on a particular value. Therefore the implicationsof three
values of a are studied. These values are 0, —.1, and —4, which
imply intertemporal elasticities of 1, 0.5, and 0.2,respectively)'
Similarly, three values of the post—war variation in p arestudied:
0.2, 0.1, and 0.05. Note that these correspond to the probability
of a nuclear holocaust before the "second period" is reached, which
may be conveniently thought of as lasting thirty years.Table 2
presents the implied range in the savings rate correspondingto the
three elasticities of substitution and the three values for the
post—war variation in p ,denoted
Table 2
Implied Changes in Saving Rate
=0.2 =0.1 p =0.05
a =0 0.0624 0.0312 0.0156
a =—l 0.0392 0.0196 0.0098
a =—4 0.0152 0.076 0.003818 —
Thepairing of the assumptions most favorable toa large shift in
saving (a =0,p=0.2)imply a response (0.0624) nearly four
times the response estimated in equations(9) and (10). The least
favorable assumptions (a =—4,p =0.05)imply a shift of 0.0038 or
about one—quarter of the estimated effect.Assumptions in the middle
range imply responses quite consistent with the econometricestimates
derived in (9) and (10).
Of course, these calculations ignore thebehavior of individuals
who have already aged one period as wellas the induced shift in desired
investment or any general equilibrium adjustments.Nevertheless, they
are suggestive that the econometric estimates havea plausible magnitude.
V. Concluding Remarks
The hypothesis examined in thispaper, if correct, has far—reaching
implications for our understanding of the performance ofthe post—war,
or post—nuclear, U.S. economy. It suggests that thethreat of nuclear
catastrophe has influenced the growth path of theeconomy and will
continue to affect the willingness of individualsto postpone consumption
for the sake of capital accumulation, Such behaviorwould be a rational
response of a society faced with the changing probability ofa limited
future. The estimates developed here indicate thata change in the
perceived threat of nuclear war from its lowestpost—war level to
its highest level is accompanied by a decline inthe annual savings
ratio of at least 1.7 percentage points, asignificant amount compared
to the amount of observed post—war variation. It alsosuggests that
the increase in international tensions since late1979 to 1981 may have— 19—
causeda decline of at least 0.8 percentage points in the savings
14/ rat io.—
I do not believe that the evidence presented in this paper decisively
establishes the impact of the threat of nuclear war on post—war
U.S. economic performance. Much more research is required, not only
concerning aggregate savings behavior,but on other aspects of the
economy. The perceived threat of nuclear war would,if the hypothesis,
is correct, influence the post—war behavior of stock market and other
asset prices, the term structure of interest rates, the rate of
investment in human capital, the mix of investment between long— and
short—lived assets, among other phenomena. At the least, though,
this research suggests that any time—series analysis of these and
sinilar phenomena which do not treat this consideration may be
ignoring a significant factor in the performance of the U.S. economy
since the beginning of the nuclear age.20 —
Footnotes
Reported in The NewYorkTimes; December 22, 1981; p. 13.
See the Gallup polls published in June of 1956, November of1956,
April of 1957, April of 1958, February of 1963, and September of1973.
See Gallup poll of March, 1963.
The formulation and notation used in this example owes muchto
Barro and Friedman (1977).
This model does not consider other possible responesto the threat
of nuclear war which may offset the tendency to slowthe accumulation of
wealth. Two such responses are movingup the planned age of retirement
(or, in general, changing the lifetime pattern of laborsupply) and
protecting oneself against the effects of a nuclear war by,say, building
a bomb shelter.
The account of the history of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
clock is adapted from the editorial in the January, 1978 issueof the
journal.
In order to calculate the 1948 movingaverage, the average setting
in 1946 was assumed to be the same as in 1947.
See The International Institute for Strategic Studies (1979) and
Kemp, Pfaltagraff, and Ra'anan (1974).
2/Thereader will note the absense ofa variable measuring the after—tax
real rate of return available to savers. This omission reflectsmy
belief that accurate measurement of this return is impossible. Amore— 21—
readilymeasurable value which affects the after—tax return, the
tax rate on corporate capital income, is included in analternate
specification discussed below. On the problems of measuringthe
real after—tax return to saving, see Howrey and Hymans (1978)and
the comments that follow.
Allvariablesreflect the revision of the national income and
product accounts released by the Department of Commercein late 1980.
The tax variable is the one calculated in Feldsteinand Poterba
(1980). Since the tax rate series beginsin 1953, this series was
extended by extrapolating the trend behavior to theend of the sample
period. Details of this extrapolation procedure canbe obtained
from the author.
Hausman (1979) finds evidence thatindividual subjective discount
rates are about 20 per cent per year. Hisconclusions are based on
a study of household behavior concerningthe purchase and utilization
of energy—using durables. Although Hausman does notappeal to the
perceived threat of nuclear war, such highdiscount rates are compatible
with the evidence cited in the text which documenthigh public concern
about a future world war.
Note that when o. is zero expressions (10)and (11) should be
interpreted in the limit sense, so that expectedutility is
alogC1 + (1 —p)I3alogC2
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists clockstood at nine minutes until
midnight during 1979. As of January, 1981,it was set to four minutes
until midnight. The estimates derived in this paper suggestthat this— 22—
increasein international tensions will be accompanies by a decline
in the annual rate of capital accumulation of 0.8 percentage points.— 23—
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